At the dawn of a new five-year term, Frédéric Charillon, professor of political science, reviews France's African and foreign policies over the past five years.
A five-year term is coming to an end, and a new page in France's foreign policy has therefore just been written. It has already been the subject of contributions,trials, or various balance sheets.
What will we remember? Have there been any significant episodes, undeniable advances, pitiful failures, major reforms?
In fact, the question no longer arises in these terms in contemporary international relations: the evaluation of a foreign policy has become difficult. The Libyan (2011) and Malian (2013) interventions, for example, initially presented as successes, were ultimately regretted (for Libya) or were subsequently complicated (at Mali).
Elsewhere, on the other hand, presidencies that were initially highly criticized in their diplomatic action were seen over time in a more favorable light, such as the Jimmy Carter's foreign policy (1977-1981) in the United States. Very enterprising administrations on the external front (Putin's Russia, Erdogan's Turkey) end up asking the question of the price of adventurism internally. The USSR of the 1970s accumulated international successes (American defeat in Vietnam, Communist victories in Angola or Mozambique, in Asia, invasion of Afghanistan…) but collapsed a few years later.
It is therefore another type of questions that must be asked, at the same time less global and more profound. Less comprehensive, because there is not "one" foreign policy assessment: this is assessed on a case-by-case basis. Deeper because a foreign policy remains above all a message and an anticipation of what will be the defense of the interests and values of a country in the world to come.
The five years that have just passed have shown strong French sequences, others essentially symbolic, while still others, less publicized, have paradoxically been able to obtain more results. At the end of this period, our diplomacy has many challenges to meet, which will have to be tackled head-on from the next term of office.
Highlights, radiance and perseverance
Young president resulting from a surprising election, Emmanuel Macron was immediately a success of curiosity in the world: the international press is interested in it, his first speeches were relayed and studied in specialist circles in many countries (journals, think tanks...).
A coherence was quickly perceived in the direction of a Europeanist, liberal (opposed in particular to the “illiberalism” approach of Eastern Europe), and multilateralist approach. The wish to speak to everyone, without taboos (about Franco-Russian summit of Versailles in 2017 until the meeting with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Mohammed bin Salman at the end of 2021, Via Egyptian Sissi), has been criticized, but assumed as a method.
Several moments marked the spirits: the speech of the Sorbonne on Europe (September 26, 2017), those of Ouagadougou on Africa (November 28, 2017), or United Nations on inequalities Total or partial spectacular visit to Beirut the day after the explosion of August 4, 2020; the restitution of works of art to several countries; attempts to dispassionate memorial issues by resorting to historians (Rwanda, Algeria), or to ease strained relations (with Putin's Russia or Trump's America); new types of multilateral summits (One planet on the environment, Choose France on economic attractiveness); strong participation in European cohesion in the Brexit negotiations ...
These initiatives were not all successful: Lebanon remain deadlocked, Algeria has not yet grasped its outstretched hand, Putin and Trump are not those who are easily coaxed ...
But other, discreet channels turned out to be more promising than what the public debate retained: in Libya, initially criticized for its support for Marshal Haftar, France hosted three key meetings with the main protagonists (July 2017, May 2018, November 2021). These efforts have helped to give this country a new prospect of a presidential election recognized by all stakeholders - even if, for the time being, the ballot has been postponed.
Other moments were more delicate. Positions were misunderstood by the partners, such as NATO's "brain death" announced by Emmanuel Macron in a British weekly interview The Economist, in November 2019), or"Demanding openness" envisaged with regard to Russia, which worried certain European neighbors and whose controversy over the existence of a "deep state" within the Quai d'Orsay ...
More unprecedented tensions also appeared: let us quote the crisis with the post-Brexit UK, the contestation of the French presence in the Sahel or the snub that constituted the abandonment of the Australian contract for the supply of French submarines...
But in the end, the link with Washington remains confident, the threads of dialogue with Moscow or Ankara have not been broken, France is talking to everyone. From episodes presented as so many "shots" have in fact, at times, advanced diplomacy.
Which France for which world?
However, is there a common thread? A "Grand strategy" ? What is France the name of in the world? What does Paris want for itself, for Europe, for international relations? Will the 2017-2022 five-year term have helped to clear up these questions? Yes and no.
Yes because - as we have said - Emmanuel Macron wanted to give a mark to his foreign policy: Europe, liberal multilateralism, the fight against inequalities were repeated elements of a discourse that was ultimately constant. No, because the means were lacking to transform these objectives into achievements, and the international context was not favorable.
Elected with a program that announced a France "Independent, humanist, European", Emmanuel Macron planned to free up budgetary leeway (by returning to financial balances), then to consolidate Europe as a power, in order to pursue an international ambition. But from yellow vests to Covid-19, the purse strings have tightened even further. From Brexit to populism, the European Union has been divided, and "Europe-power" remains untraceable, despite some progress.
Paris is today very alone to want to resuscitate it again. The affair would no doubt have been different with a David Cameron in Downing Street, a Barack Obama in the White House, and an unhindered Angela Merkel in Berlin. But, arriving at the Élysée in 2017, Emmanuel Macron had to swim against the tide. Trumpism, then Boris Johnson and the difficult German coalition which emerged from the close elections of 2017 made this European president, liberal, free-trade and multilateralist, a resister in the midst of obstacles, more than a driving force in his natural environment.
What is more, Russia is making a strong comeback in the European security game, and China in the global game, with intentions that cannot be qualified as friendly. In Africa, where France often measures its power, and barely in the Sahel, nine years after the start of its military intervention in Mali, these two protagonists are omnipresent.
Ankara joined this authoritarian club, and the Franco-Turkish relations have been appalling, until passing close to the military incident (in June 2020, off the Libyan coast). Turkish tutelage over part of European Islam greatly contributes to the tension between the two countries: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has spared no efforts to denounce an "Islamophobic" France, also disturbing the NATO game, and increasing migratory pressures on the European Union.
French diplomacy sees its adversaries gaining ground, its budgetary resources dwindle, the challenges multiply. Emmanuel Macron seems to have made the link - rightly - between the defense of values and the defense of interests. Because what interests remain to be defended in a world dominated by powers with values opposed to ours? Without presenting the stake in the form of a crusade nor evoking "Containment" - as the United States often does - France pointed out the threat emerging from this increasingly clear divide between liberal democracies and national-authoritarian populisms.
Challenges ahead
To face these challenges, do we need a new diplomatic instrument? There was no reform of the Quai d'Orsay under Emmanuel Macron (there had been some under Nicolas Sarkozy with Bernard kouchner as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and under François Hollande with Laurent Fabius. Even though the ENA reform, which became the National Institute of Public Service, and the abolition of the diplomatic corps may turn things around.
What would be missing then? A higher budget, of course, but the world economy cannot be controlled. Or even a stronger awareness of wars of influence that are coming.
The Quai d'Orsay has just issued a "Influence roadmap", which shows that the subject is finally emerging. But influence is also a culture, which will be long to take root and costly to maintain. It supposes a registration in the international circuit of ideas, with think tanks, the organization of international events, or dedicated structures, which will take time and money to set up.
There is also a debate on the tools for strategic thinking that is both more innovative, more irrigated by thoughts outside the State, and more systematically taken into account at the highest level of the decision-making process.
Should we create a "National Security Council" à la française, that is to say a body responsible for coordinating thinking and advising the president on strategic affairs? Attached to whom? With what means? To replace what, or how to superimpose on it? Should we put on the job the reflection on the external audiovisual, inefficient in France despite some successes (such as RFI, which has found its global audience for a long time, or France 24, whose program in English is well identified with the foreigner) ? Review the philosophy and relays of development aid? Play more with private actors, for example by consulting better with NGOs? Find thematic niches for a “nation branding” of French diplomacy, in order to identify on the world stage the subjects on which France is at the forefront? During the past five years, it is understandable that other emergencies may have delayed these reflections. They cannot be postponed indefinitely.
Frédéric charillon, professor of political science, Clermont Auvergne University (UCA)
This article is republished from The Conversation under Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article.