What future for semi-authoritarian populism in Tunisia after the legislative elections?

The first round of Tunisian legislative elections in December was marked by record abstention, a sign of citizens' disaffection with President Saïed's hybrid regime.

With the holding of legislative elections on 17 December and 29 January, Tunisia has taken a new step in the application of its new Constitution of 2022, adopted at the initiative of President Saied, who came to power in 2019.

These elections were organized nine months after the dissolution of the previous Parliament by the president following the failure of the Mechichi government (2020-2021), supported by a parliamentary coalition led by the Islamist party Ennahdha, in coping with the Covid-19 crisis. They cannot be called “unfree”; however, they have not been fully free and fair.

As the saying goes Carter Center, one of the most trusted NGOs on electoral issues:

“While the elections were technically well administered, the process behind them lacked legitimacy and failed to meet international and regional standards and obligations. »

The voters have understood this by largely boycotting the ballot. The very low turnout, which amounted to only 11,22% in the first round et 11,3% (provisional figure) in the second, represented a record abstention and constituted a snub for Kaïs Saïed since he wanted a high turnout - whereas almost all the political parties in the country had called on voters not to go to the polls). The outcome of this electoral process undermines the Tunisian political system and casts doubt on the political future of Saïed, a potential candidate for re-election in 2024.

A presidential regime that reduces Parliament to a bare minimum

These elections have highlighted both the resilience and the limits of President Saïed's mode of governance: hybrid in nature, it is similar to what we call “semi-authoritarian populism”.

Such a regime carries certain specificities. Chief among these is an individualistic approach to politics, a style of government by fiat, in which little or no political dialogue takes place between the dominant decision-maker, a kind of leader Tunisian, and intermediary bodies. This individualistic approach is one of the main reasons why several major parties – the Islamists of Ennahdha, the sympathizers of the former regime of Addoustouri al-Hor, the social democrats of Attayar – boycotted the legislative elections, the same way they had boycotted the referendum on the new Constitution. We are witnessing the erosion of the concrete space of politics for the benefit of a single actor, without however the freedom of political action being totally restricted in the country.

In the current presidential regime, the head of state cannot be accountable to parliament or removed from office, except in exceptional circumstances. The new Parliament resulting from the elections which have just been held is paralyzed due to certain provisions of the new Constitution: it is impossible for it to choose the head of government (he is now appointed by the President) and the representation of the parties is weakened.

Indeed, the new electoral law, published by Saïed on September 15, 2022 in the form of a simple decree without prior political debate, obliges candidates to present their candidacy and campaign individually and without party affiliation. In addition, public funding of political parties is now prohibited. It is therefore difficult for the electorate to distinguish between candidates affiliated with parties and the large number of candidates running as independents. THE boycott of the elections by political parties has led to the entry of a large number of independent deputies into Parliament, complicating the formation of influential political blocs and therefore of a credible opposition.

Partial authoritarianism

Another major characteristic of semi-authoritarian populism is the delicate balance between restricting freedom of expression and maintaining certain spaces of freedom. For example, opposition figures who go against the line promoted by state television, which is now totally aligned with the president are no longer welcome since coup de force of July 25, 2021 by which Kaies Saïed proclaimed a state of emergency, suspended Parliament and assumed very broad prerogatives.

Very few political debates take place on television, in particular because of the pressure exerted on the owners of private television channels. A new presidential decree, the “Decree No. 54” (published September 13, 2022), threatens freedom of expression by introducing penalties of up to 10 years in prison for what could amount to “spreading fake news”. Some political activists are already being investigated under the new law.

However, criticism of the president is frequently found on political radio broadcasts, in print and digital media, and on social media. Saïed's political opponents are regularly invited to appear on the only major daily political program on the private channel Attessia TV and on the main political programs on the radio.

The way authorities deal with public political protests is another example of this hybrid approach. They frequently allow opposition street protests, but tend to limit the access of activists to these gatherings, by setting up a series of roadblocks on the roads leading to the capital and in the city center.

Such a hybrid approach makes it difficult to compare Saïed's reign with the authoritarianism of Ben Ali (president from 1987 to 2011). Not only does Saïed seem so far free from major pressure both internally and from the international community, but he does not want to be compared to any previous leader in Tunisia's history. When he talks about his style of government, he emphasizes the fact that Tunisia lives under his mandate “an unprecedented cultural revolution”.

Semi-authoritarian populism is a major challenge for democratic activism, especially in the current Tunisian political context. The opposition is divided between the Salvation Front, led mainly by the Islamist Ennahda party, sympathizers of the old regime by Addoustour al-Horr, and the Social Democrats led by a group of five parties. But it is unappealing to Tunisians, not least because of the 2011-2019 period between the Ben Ali era and Saied's rise to power, when an ineffective elite ruled and did not meet the expectations of the electorate in economic and social reform.

Moreover, she systematically refuses to engage in serious self-criticism and come to terms with its grassroots base. Saied does not need to outlaw his opposition and become fully authoritarian until it is politically able to shift the balance of power. This is perhaps one of the main reasons behind the resilience of his regime.

The IMF's Sword of Damocles

The record abstention in the elections, however, showed the popular disavowal suffered by Saïed and augurs well for possible threats to his power.

The next "painful reforms" to be introduced in the wake of Tunisia's final agreement with the IMF, which still lingers amid a growing uncertainty, could result in strong social protest.

The main paradox of semi-authoritarian populism is the stark contradiction between its statements (“the people are good and the elite are evil”) and its “anti-people” policies. This contradiction is flagrant in the official discourse on the "reforms" to come: on the one hand, the agreement with the IMF of October 15, 2022 negotiated by the government declares that it "will gradually eliminate subsidies which encourage waste" and a possible privatization of certain public companies is mentioned (as the director of the IMF said in a interview of October 16, 2022) ; on the other hand, the repeated declarations of Saïed clearly reject the end of the system of subsidies and the privatization of public enterprises.

These contradictions could endanger the reign of Saïed, weakened by the generalized boycott of the legislative elections, and who must probably expect major social unrest in the coming months.

Tarek Kahlaoui, Associate Professor of History and International Relations, South Mediterranean University

This article is republished from The Conversation under Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article.