This marker, which aims to assess the intensity of greenhouse gas emissions, poses many methodological problems.
The so-called “carbon footprint” indicator is often used by NGOs to define the intensity of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the richest countries.
To also denounce the fact that the emission reductions that are observed there are most often illusory, because they essentially result from industrial relocations to emerging countries.
The carbon footprint would thus constitute a marker of the global pressure exerted by the lifestyle and the consumption model of the richest on the planet.
A debated notion
Measuring this footprint raises a number of difficulties because it counts direct emissions (from the combustion of fossil fuels), which are easily measurable, and indirect emissions (in the products consumed), which are less so.
Furthermore, the footprint does not constitute the reference in international climate negotiations, in which only direct emissions, observed in the various national territories, are considered.
Definitions and works in this area are numerous.
To analyze the interest and the limits of the concept of carbon footprint, we rely in particular on the work of Lucas Chancel within the World Inequality Lab and on the analyzes of Antonin Pottier and his co-authors of the review of the OFCE.
Territorial GHG emissions vs carbon footprint
The first method of accounting for emissions that was used in the climate negotiations is based on the emissions observed in each national territory.
It stems from inventories calculating the quantities of greenhouse gases emitted in one year and on the territory by all the actors (so-called “production” approach). The data, taken from inventories according to the standards of the UNFCCC, are currently favored within the COPs in climate negotiations.
The second (carbon footprint) results from a calculation of the direct and indirect GHG emissions associated with the final consumption of the inhabitants of a territory, to which we add the emissions induced outside this territory (approach known as "to the consumption ").
The joint analysis of the levels of territorial emissions and of the footprint per inhabitant, as below, reveals very contrasting situations. Countries that globally import industrial products have a greater footprint than territorial emissions; and vice versa for exporting countries.
For France, the gap is significant, since the footprint is now 43% higher than territorial emissions, this gap having increased significantly due to industrial relocations, accelerated after the economic crisis of 2008.
The situation of countries with carbon energy resources is more complex: for the major coal-producing countries – Australia, South Africa, Russia – their energy system is very coal-intensive, particularly for electricity, and their territorial emissions are very high; but Norway is a different case, its domestic electricity system being largely carbon-free, while oil and gas exports increase the country's carbon footprint; in this case, the footprint is greater than the territorial emissions.
In climate negotiations, the choice of direct emissions as the basic indicator can be explained for historical, methodological and political reasons.
While it was very early possible to evaluate, in a rigorous manner, territorial emissions from the observed consumption of fossil fuels, the evaluation of the footprint poses formidable methodological problems. In particular, account must be taken of the foreign trade of each country and the average carbon content of the products, which is difficult to assess.
In climate negotiations, these difficulties could lead to endless controversies. And finally, it is on their national territory that States are responsible and must deploy efforts to reduce emissions.
Considerable carbon inequalities
Footprint inequalities between countries are considerable: there is thus a gap of 1 to 10 within the G20 (from India to the United States); and an even larger gap if we broaden the spectrum of countries (from Rwanda to Qatar).
These inequalities are found within each country, but they are often less pronounced: in France, households in the last income decile emit 2,3 times more on average than households in the first decile.
There is therefore a combination of inter- and sub-national inequalities.
But the relative weight of these two factors in global inequality has changed a great deal over the past forty years: after more than a century of constant increase in international carbon footprint inequalities, the trend reversed around 1980, when the globalization of the economy and the rise in consumption in emerging countries.
Indeed, for income, the weight of international inequalities in global inequality has fallen from 57% then to 32% today. There is, with the rise of the middle classes in emerging countries, a certain homogenization of living conditions internationally.
Carbon footprint inequalities are obviously strongly correlated with income and consumption inequalities. At the global level, the share of the 1% of the largest emitters represents 17% of total emissions, the share of the richest 1% being 19% of global income. However, the share of the 50% least emitters (growing to 12% today) is much higher than the share of income of the poorest 50% (7,5%).
This suggests that the consumption of the poorest corresponds to consumption that makes it possible to satisfy “basic needs”, with a higher material and energy content, and a lower service content.
How to interpret carbon footprint measurements?
Footprint indicators provide us with information on the state of inequalities and their development trends: these gaps are considerable and difficult to sustain, but they are not necessarily increasing, whether for the carbon footprint or for the income share of the poorest.
From this point of view, globalization, which accelerated in 1980, rather marked a reduction in global inequalities, by reducing international inequalities.
Before questioning the use of such an observation, it is necessary to question the limits of the measurements. Despite the great rigor of the work and the quantity of data used, the calculations remain subject to discussion, mainly from three perspectives, identified by Antonin Pottier and his colleagues.
Firstly, we must consider the difference between the "vertical inequalities" of footprint, across the different sections of the population (deciles) and the "horizontal inequalities" within the same section (type of housing, urban/rural, location by relation to work, accessibility to services, etc.).
In France, within each decile there is a ratio of one to two; the 25% largest emitters in the first decile emit as much as the 25% lowest emitters in the last decile: the rich are not all equal in terms of their carbon footprint…
Secondly, significant biases can result from the attribution of programs according to an average content by major category of final consumption, without fine differentiation of the goods consumed. This leads to ignoring the “quality effect”: the emissions induced by the purchase of a Porsche 911 are not 10 times higher than those of a Dacia Stepway, ten times less expensive. However, with an average emission coefficient per unit of automotive expenditure in euros, this is however what will be counted.
Finally, these calculations refer to a perspective of individual responsibility in emissions, even though indirect emissions result from the functioning of all the infrastructures and the socio-technical system, whose individuals – whether they are very rich or very poor – do not are not masters.
In a certain way, only leisure programs constitute the true leeway for individuals.
How to use footprint calculations?
However, public policies for the climate must take into account both income inequalities and carbon footprint inequalities. This in national policies, as in the choices of integration into the international economy.
The World Inequality Lab proposes a very political program of action, differentiated according to income class. For the poorest 50%: make public investments for infrastructure, buildings and green energies, while helping to convert “carbon jobs”.
For the middle class (the middle 40%): encourage household investment in the renovation of housing and the conversion of vehicles, while introducing stricter standards in these two areas.
For the richest (10%): introduction of a climate tax on wealth, with an increase for carbon financial assets, and a “carbon passport”, to cap the highest personal footprints.
This program differs from the solutions offered by economists of the Economic Analysis Council, which focus above all on redistributing carbon tax revenue, favoring the poorest households. The debate on the relative effectiveness and acceptability of these two types of programmatic proposals remains open today.
Choices in terms of international integration and the management of productive locations are also essential for the management of the carbon footprint, in particular to prevent the reduction of territorial emissions from being reflected, as has been the case in the past, by an increase in imported emissions measured by the footprint. The risks of “carbon leakage”, ie industrial relocation to countries where carbon pricing is lower than in Europe, must be combated.
This is the purpose of introducing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, currently envisaged in Europe and which will be supported by the French presidency. It is an initiative that raises technical difficulties and will concern only a small number of industries. But these are the most emitting and this initiative is necessary.
More generally, the gap between territorial emissions and carbon footprint relates to the question of industrial relocations. These are likely to reduce the economic and ecological costs of long-distance transport. It is still necessary that the production capacities in Europe are sufficiently efficient both ecologically and economically.
Patrick Criqui, Emeritus Research Director at CNRS, Grenoble Alpes University (UGA) and Carine Sebi, Associate Professor and coordinator of the “Energy for Society” chair, Grenoble School of Management (GEM)
This article is republished from The Conversation under Creative Commons license. Read theoriginal article.