ECOWAS wants to create a joint intervention force. If this must make it possible to fight against terrorism, it must also make it possible to avoid coups d'etat.
Yesterday and this Monday, the Ministers of Defense of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are trying, during a conclave in Guinea-Bissau, to speed up the establishment of the joint force of intervention in charge of fighting terrorism in the region.
Yes, in recent years, ECOWAS has become an economic and, by extension, political tool, it is worth recalling that, in 1999, it had adopted a "Protocol relating to the mechanism for the Prevention, Management, Conflict Resolution, Maintenance of Peace and Security", which was then "intended to ensure the collective security and peace" in West Africa. The war against terrorism therefore falls within the prerogatives of the sub-regional institution.
But this famous "joint force" will in reality have another function, which responds this time to the "Additional Protocol on democracy and good governance" adopted in December 2001. Officially, for ECOWAS it is a question of "positively influencing the political and security developments" of its Member States.
The ECOWAS defense ministers also hope to limit the number of coups in the region, thanks to this joint force. On this point, it is puzzling. As we know, ECOWAS does not like to see its member presidents dismissed. But is it for all that its role to fight against the putschs?
It was at the end of the 62nd Summit of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, two weeks ago, that the institution decided on this project to create a new regional force intended to "fight against terrorism” and against “unconstitutional changes”. A force which will be financed by means of the Member States.
The joint force is reminiscent of ECOMOG. Created in 1990, after the start of the civil war in Liberia, the White Helmets brigade gradually disappeared, in favor of the UN forces. It remains to be seen whether the member countries of ECOWAS really have the possibility of financing such operations, when we know how much the G5-Sahel struggles to be effective.