According to the press close to the government in Chad and Togo, the Togolese diplomacy would have organized, for weeks, a series of meetings with the aim of promoting the Chadian national dialogue.
On the Chadian, Togolese and French press, we learn the existence of several diplomatic maneuvers, with a view to the success of the national dialogue in Chad. The key players in these negotiations would be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo, Robert Dussey, as well as President Faure Gnassingbé. The emissaries of the two men are said to have met representatives of Chadian rebel groups. In this case the Front de la Nation pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (FNDJT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (CCMSR) and the Union of Resistance Forces (UFR). Without forgetting, of course, the Front for Alternation and Concord (FACT), supposedly behind the death of former President Idriss Déby Itno.
Since the death of the late president, and the succession of his son Mahamat Déby, Faure Gnassingbé has increased his friendly gestures towards Chad. On the one hand, the Chadian case represented a path towards the diplomatic position that the Togolese state has been trying to occupy for months, that of a mediator. On the other hand, the Togolese failure in Mali slowed down this dynamic.
The semantics of the media which promoted this supposed “mediation” of Lomé in the Chadian case testifies to certain ambiguities. Some rebel groups are said to have withdrawn from the talks amid Chad's refusal of a general amnesty.
Chad, a cardinal point in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel
Faure Gnassingbé's interest in Sahelian diplomacy is multidimensional. First of all, his intervention in Mali represented a chance to return to favor for the Head of State. vis-à-vis France. In addition, if we believe the alert of the boss of French intelligence, Togo, Benin and Côte d'Ivoire would be the targets of the exodus of Sahelian terrorist groups. Finally, Faure Gnassingbé tries, as best he can, to highlight the stability of his country in the face of the political and security chaos that reigns in the other countries of the Gulf of Guinea.
However, Faure Gnassingbé is not alone in contention for this title. His rivals, who show better results for a lower cost, were not successful with Emmanuel Macron. Benin has curled up militarily, like Togo, which ultimately did not come out more favorite. As for diplomacy, the hyperactivity of Robert Dussey in Mali and Burkina Faso did not succeed in the two countries. The two countries did not remain in the French camp, in the end. And seek economic and military cooperation with the Algerian-Russian axis.
It was then that Togo was abandoned by France. Who did not obtain the French support expected by the trip of Gnassingbé to Paris on May 18, on the sidelines of the Summit of African Economies. Also, with the advent of the last coup in Mali, Togo found itself ejected in favor of an ECOWAS mediator.
Ambiguities and semantics
Then, Togo showed its dissatisfaction by presenting itself at the gates of the Commonwealth. Threatening France to quit its list of allies in Africa. However, if the French media are highlighting this mysterious “Togolese mediation in Chad”, there is a reason. It started last week with the return to Chad of Hassan Fadoul Kitir. The Chadian opponent spent 21 years in exile in Togo. The nicknamed “the enfant terrible” is said to have encouraged the FACT rebellion from his exile. And he was, until Mahamat Déby's coup d'état, an enemy of Chadian power.
However, Mahamat Déby's attempts to make the Chadian national dialogue successful are the result of French will. The President of France Emmanuel Macron made it clear that he "was not for a succession plan, but for the maintenance of stability". This stability would necessarily require an agreement between the powerful Chadian opponents and warlords and the young Mahamat Déby. And this is where Gnassingbé comes in, the very example of a “stable succession plan” for France.
Between Baba Laddé and Yaya Dillo, some rebels had returned to N'Djaména's good graces for weeks. Thanks, in particular, to French mediation and to a recent agreement between the Zaghawas, the Toubous and the Peuls of Chad. Others, on the other hand, such as Mahamat Hally and Mahamat Mahdi Ali are still at war with the Déby regime. Despite the defeat of FACT, CCMSR and the capture of hundreds of their warriors by the Chadian army, these more politicized rebels want to fight their way to power.
Another fiasco for Faure Gnassingbé?
However, the groups mentioned in the press articles are just as persecuted by the Chadian justice system. The UFR, the FNDJT, the FACT and its ally the CCMSR could not participate in any national dialogue if there is no amnesty. It is therefore curious to know what would be the role of Togo in the Chadian quagmire. If it is a question of agreeing the demands of the rebels, the latter do it very well on their own. Each Chadian armed group has its own communication platform, and the rebel leaders are rather talkative.
As for the return to Chad of Hassan Fadoul Tikri, it is only a friendly gesture between the Togolese and Chadian governments. Chadian justice still pursues Tikri for a case of counterfeit money. And this case is not even a priority for Mahamat Déby. The chairman of the Chadian CMT is no more conciliatory with Iran than Faure Gnassingbé or Emmanuel Macron.
The question would therefore be quite simple. Would Mahamat Déby be ready to pardon all the rebels and release the prisoners of war? If so, he will be able to conduct his own talks. Otherwise, Faure Gnassingbé and Robert Dussey would suffer another diplomatic defeat. Anyway, the rise of the Chadian national dialogue is not in the strings of Faure Gnassingbé. Finally, the only shortfall here for the masters of diplomacy in Lomé would be a press title. And it seems, too, that these mysterious "diplomatic efforts" are headed for another fiasco. A coup de com de Faure Gnassingbé, no doubt. But whose boom is not unlike that experienced by the Malian talks.